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Abstract
Recently, much research interest is directed towards the impact of migration on
the sending country. However, we think that this literature does not successfully
analyse the effects of migration on unemployment and wage rates especially in
urban areas. It studies the effect of one kind of migration flow, mainly inter-
national migration, on labour market in the country of origin and shows that
international migration is able to reduce the unemployment rate and/or raise the
wage rate. However, it is common to find labour markets affected simultaneously
by inflows and outflows of workers. Using a detailed CGE model applied to the
Moroccan economy, we show that if we take simultaneously into account Moroc-
can emigration to the European Union, immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa
into Moroccan urban areas and rural-urban migration, the impact on Moroccan
urban labour market disaggregated by professional categories is ambiguous.
Keywords: Imperfect labour market, Migration, Computable general equilib-
rium model.
JEL Classification: C68, F22, J44, J61, J64
1 Introduction
Analysing the impact of migration on Moroccan unemployment is an interesting
question. Unemployment, which represented less than 17% of the economic causes
of emigration before 1960, far behind the search for a more lucrative work (50%)
or the improvement of the living standards (25%), became the principal economic
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cause of emigration in the 90s. According to the data collected by Hamdouch
(2000), 41% of answers indicate unemployment as the first cause of emigration,
whereas the search for a more lucrative work and the improvement of the standard
of living represent 38% and 14% respectively of the reasons for emigration. The
relation between migration and economic development of the country of origin
has not been correctly addressed for a long time primarily because of the scarcity
of reliable data on migratory flows and migrants characteristics at the macro and
micro levels1. In the majority of the cases, studies have mainly analysed the
impact of migration on the country of destination2, and in very rare occasions
on the country of origin. Only a limited number of studies address the impact of
migration (directly or indirectly through remittances) on inequality and wages,
growth and welfare, its social effects (children health, education, women’s role...),
or the impact of returned migrants who acquired experience in the host country
and the relation between migration and trade3. The “brain drain” and “brain
gain” were also the issue addressed by several works.
The very few works that try to encircle in a systematic way the impact of
migration on labour market are limited to the effect of international migration
on unemployment in developing countries. However, it is common to find that
labour mobility is observed in several directions. For example, a transitory South-
South migration, from a developing country towards another before migrating to
a developed country, can coexist with internal migration from rural to urban ar-
eas, or emigration to more developed countries. The combination of these forces
is able to exert unexpected effects on the labour market, and in order to under-
stand them and study their consequences, we choose the Moroccan case. Indeed,
Morocco seems the typical example of a developing country undergoing the com-
bination of different migratory flows: rural and urban emigration towards the
European Union, internal migration from rural to urban areas, and finally Sub-
Saharan immigration to Morocco for transit towards Europe or in order to stay
there definitely.
A sketchy analysis of the impact of these migratory flows on unemployment
and labour remuneration would lead us to conclude that on one hand, urban
emigration reduces urban unemployment rates and raises wages, whereas inter-
nal migration and Sub-Saharan immigration to the cities increase the pressure
on urban labour market. However, the simultaneous impact of these different
forces on labour market conditions cannot be predicted without ambiguity since
it will depend on the magnitude of each migratory flow and the initial condi-
tions of the labour market. If internal migration to urban areas and Sub-Saharan
immigration to Morocco dominate urban emigration, urban unemployment rate
1Fortunately, databases become increasingly available, like the one of Docquier and Marfouk
(2004) on brain drain.
2For a review of the literature on the effects of migration on the destination country, see
Drinkwater et al. (2003).
3For a review of the literature on the effects of migration on the sending country, see Katseli
et al. (2006).
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must increase. Conversely, if urban emigration overrides internal migration and
Sub-Saharan immigration, unemployment rate will probably decrease.
In order to take the existing forces simultaneously into account, we build a
computable general equilibrium model. This method allows to endogenize the
principal determinants of migratory flows and to capture their simultaneous di-
rect effects on urban labour market, particularly on unemployment, and their
direct and indirect effects on the remainder of the economy. Contrary to other
studies on this question4, we do not think that an aggregate approach is sufficient
to seize the complexity of the existing mechanisms, and this is why we have privi-
leged a fine disaggregation by professional categories. This fine description of the
labour market which will take into account unemployment rates by professional
categories is justified by the fact that emigration and immigration do not affect
all categories in the same way. It will enable us to seize the impact of migration
on each segment of labour market.
The paper is structured in five sections. Section 1 is an introductory section.
Section 2 describes Moroccan labour market. Section 3 presents, in addition to
the general structure of the CGEmodel we have built, the principal characteristics
of the migratory block. Section 4 shows the results of a 10% fall in migration costs,
a 10% rise of the Sub-Saharan immigrant stock, and finally, the simultaneous
effects of the two previous shocks. Section 5 concludes and discusses the economic
policy implications of this study.
2 Short description of the Moroccan labour market
Data from OECD (OECD 2006) indicate that the traditional destinations of
Moroccan international migrants such as Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, and the
Netherlands continue to receive important migratory flows. Thus, in 2004, 8,000
Moroccans entered to Belgium, 21,700 to France, 24,600 to Italy, 3,300 to the
Netherlands and 58,800 to Spain, with 21.5% of the foreign population living in
Spain in 2002. Moroccan Spanish represented the largest foreign community in
this country. Moreover and according to an opinion of the International Organi-
zation of Migration, Moroccan migration towards the European Union is mostly
originated from rural areas (Van der Erf and Heering (2002)).
Concerning internal migration, climatic risks associated to agricultural pro-
duction induce farmers migration towards the cities. These rural workers search
for a stable employment in order to mitigate the fall or the great fluctuations
of their agricultural income. The available estimations indicate that each year,
approximately 200,000 migrants move into urban areas, which is equivalent to
40% of the total increase in urban population (Age´nor and El Aynaoui (2003)).
The extremely fast expansion of clandestine migration from Sub-Saharan
4See for example Age´nor and El Aynaoui (2003).
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Africa since the beginning of the 90s is due to the fragility of this continent.
The exacerbation of poverty, the shortage of natural resources (water in particu-
lar) and conflicts and wars of any nature encourage African immigrants to transit
by Morocco in direction of Spain and Europe5 or to settle definitely in Morocco
in order to profit from its stability and prosperity. One of the more important
consequences of illegal immigration into Morocco is the fact that an increasingly
significant number of Sub-Saharan immigrants, scalded by the difficulties they
meet on the migratory way leading them to Europe, choose finally to stay in
different Moroccan localities (rather urban). Data on Sub-Saharan immigration
to Morocco are fragmentary and their collection is made difficult because the
majority of African immigrants are illegal. Lahlou (2003) pointed out that there
would be between 6,000 and 15,000 irregular migrants. We will retain the upper
bound.
Let us examine Moroccan labour market characteristics6. National employ-
ment is roughly equally distributed between rural and urban areas. In 2005,
urban employment constituted 50.5% of national employment. This percentage
varies slightly with respect to the previous years.
Table 1- Employment (%) by aggregate sectors of activity in 2005
Sectors National Rural Urban
Agriculture 45.5 80.2 5.2
Industry 12.4 3.9 22.3
Services 26 8.8 45.9
Construction 7.1 5.2 9.3
Public sector 9 1.9 17.3
Source: Department of Statistics, Rabat
The structure of employment by sectors of activity shows the relatively im-
portant weight of agriculture. In 2005, this sector, absorbing 45.5% of national
employment, predominates in rural areas, with 80.2% of total rural employment,
and is particularly based on family work. The services sector is ranked second
with 26% of national employment. However, it is the principal provider of urban
employment (45.9%). The industrial sector occupies only 12.4% of total employ-
ment (3.9% in rural areas against 22.3% in urban areas). The construction sector
employs 7.1% of total labour (9.3% in the cities and 5.2% in the campaigns).
5The transit by Morocco is explained by geographical reasons (Morocco being at 14 km of the
Spanish coast), by historical, sometimes cultural and religious reasons, and by socio-economic
reasons like the possibility to work on spot during the long waiting periods or all along the
migratory way.
6The illustrative figures come from the survey of the Department of Statistics on activity,
employment and unemployment in 2005. The ventilation of employment between different pro-
fessional categories is taken from the Analytical Nomenclature of Professions established by the
Department of Statistics (2001).
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Employment opportunities come principally from the private sector. The latter
offers 91% of total employment at the national level (98% in rural areas and 83%
in urban areas). On the other hand, the public sector employs primarily towns-
men (17.3% of total employment in the cities against only 1.9% in the campaigns).
Table 2- Employment (%) by professional categories in 20057
Professions National Rural Urban
Directors... 0.8 0.1 1.6
Senior executive... 1.1 0 2.4
Junior staff 3.6 0.4 7.2
Employees 7.9 1.6 15.2
Commercants... 7.5 3.3 12.4
Farmers... 12.4 21.6 1.7
Craftsmen... 16.3 6.6 27.5
Workmen and farm labourers... 32.6 58.1 3.2
Drivers... 3 1.3 5
Warehousemen... 14.8 7 23.8
Source: Department of Statistics, Rabat
The distribution of Moroccan working population by professional categories
shows that at the national level, the most exerted profession is “workmen and
farm labourers”. The category “craftsmen and artisanal trades qualified workers”
comes in the second place followed by the category “warehousemen and workers
of small trades”. In rural areas, the category “workmen and farm labourers”
occupies the first place followed by the category “farmers, fishermen, foresters,
hunters and workers assimilate”, “warehousemen and workers of small trades”
and “craftsmen and artisanal trades qualified workers”. The examination of ur-
ban working population indicates that the share of the category “workmen and
farm labourers” is not more than 3.2%, and the category “craftsmen and artisanal
trades qualified workers” is henceforth ranked first followed by “warehousemen
and workers of small trades”, “employees” and “commercants, commercial and
financial intermediaries”.
In total, we display two segments of labour market: urban and rural, each one
composed of 10 under segments of professional categories.
Table 3- National unemployment rate (%) by professional categories in
2005
7The exact headings of professions can be examined in Appendix 2.
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Professions Unemployment rates
Directors... 2.2
Senior executive... 1.7
Junior staff 6.1
Employees 11.2
Commercants... 3.2
Farmers... 0.3
Craftsmen... 10.1
Workmen and farm labourers... 2
Drivers... 8.5
Warehousemen... 12
Source: Department of Statistics, Rabat
As in many developing countries, unemployment in Morocco is primarily an
urban phenomenon. Unemployment rate rose in 1999 to 22% and diminished to
18.3% in 2005. In contrast, rural unemployment rate is not more than 3.6% in
2005. At the national level, unemployment rate reached 13.9% in 1999 but fall
to 11% in 2005. In addition, unpublished data provided by the Department of
Statistics show that the professions “warehousemen...”, “employees” and “crafts-
men and artisanal trades qualified workers” have the higher unemployment rates
(12%, 11.2% and 10.1% respectively). On the other hand, “farmers...” and “se-
nior executive...” exhibit the lowest rates (0.3% and 1.7% respectively).
3 Theoretical framework
If we wish to analyse correctly the impact of migration on the different segments
of labour market, it will be important to identify the origin of migratory flows.
Thus and if one can think that Moroccan emigration from rural or urban areas
will relax the pressure on the corresponding domestic labour markets, the drop
in labour supply in the countryside or the city will induce a rise in rural or urban
wages. Given that unemployment is an important characteristic of urban labour
market, emigration of urban workers, when it touches mainly some professional
categories, will obviously reduce unemployment rates for these categories and
not for the others, if there is some degree of specificity of the qualifications. On
the contrary, migration of rural workers towards cities and the entry of African
immigrants into urban areas increase labour supply and unemployment rates of
the different professions. Since emigration and immigration do not touch the
same categories, their impact will be different from a market to another. It is
also clear that the eventual labour surplus on some segments of labour market
will reduce wages (freely fixed by the market or negotiated by the means of a
wage convention). When these migratory flows coexist, the ultimate effect on
urban unemployment rates by professional categories is ambiguous. In order to
understand these effects, a fine modelisation of labour market, illustrative of all
these migratory movements, is necessary. The remainder of this section describes
the behavioural assumptions we retain.
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Our benchmark computable general equilibrium model is a standard one in-
spired from the model of Decaluwe´ et al. (2001) developed by Cockburn et al.
(2006). This basic structure will however be deeply modified in order to de-
scribe adequately the behaviour of labour market and the internal and external
determinants of migratory flows. Very briefly, our version of this model contains
34 monoproductive sectors distributed between two aggregate sectors: a rural
sector (agriculture and fishing) and an urban sector (industry, tradable services
and non tradable services); two factors of production (a labour factor bundle
of the different professional rural/urban categories mobile between rural/urban
sectors and a capital factor specific for each sector); five agents (rural and urban
households, firms, government, and the Rest of the World). Then, we modify the
specification of the rural sector in order to distinguish, within this sector, between
subsistence agriculture and industrial agriculture. Given the relative complemen-
tarity of capital and labour in the public value added, the latter is modeled using
a Leontief function, contrarily to private value added represented by a CES8. We
endogenize labour supply on each segment of labour market and we take into
account unemployment rates by professional categories. We further assume that
unemployed persons can not change their profession. In other words, the cross
elasticity of labour supply should be null. Finally, we introduce a new block of
equations relative to rural and urban emigration, internal migration from rural
to urban areas and Sub-Saharan immigration, and we suppose the existence of
migration costs. Our model is calibrated on the SAM of the year 1998.
We describe here the new equations. All the equations can be examined in
Appendix 3.
3.1 Migratory flows
3.1.1 Migration costs
When an individual or a household migrates from a region to another or when he
decides to leave his country, this can not be done without costs. Any migratory
movement induces financial costs (travel cost, search for an apartment, search
for a job...) and psychological costs (change of the way of life, adaptation to
a new culture and a new community...) for the migrant. In order to express
migration costs, we adopt the approach proposed by Chan et al. (2005): when
workers migrate from a region to another due to wage differentials, their net wage
in the region of destination is lower than the effective wage in this region, where
the difference represents migration costs. To seize this phenomenon, the authors
consider that this gap is equivalent to a reduction in household’s available time
to work and results in a reduction of his labour endowment. In other words,
migration costs are a fraction of the migratory flow. For lack of precise infor-
mation on the width of this cost, we follow Chan et al. (2005) who postulate
8Constant Elasticity of Substitution.
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that migration costs are equal to 10% of the international migratory flow. Given
that migrant labour supply in the region of destination is reduced of 10%, total
labour remuneration of their work decreases too. For internal migration, the cost
of labour mobility is obviously lower than international mobility and we suppose
that internal migration costs are equal to 5% of the migratory flow9. In the dy-
namic version of the model, these costs are brought to decrease gradually during
the first periods and vanish thereafter.
We neglect adjustment costs associated with Sub-Saharan immigration because
we suppose that the latter is exogenous and not motivated by economic factors.
Indeed, according to Lahlou (2003), political and security factors (disorders and
conflicts between and inside several African countries) play a crucial role in stimu-
lating illegal African immigration to Morocco. Thus, migration towards Morocco
takes place whatever migration costs fall down or not.
3.1.2 Internal and international migration from rural areas
Two types of migratory flows take place from rural areas: internal migration
towards the cities and international migration. In 1960, more than 70% of Mo-
roccans lived in rural zones. Four decades later, they are not more than 46% due
to internal migration from rural areas to cities and to foreign countries. Migra-
tion phenomenon seems originated mainly from rural areas. The gap between
annual growth rates of rural and urban populations, which was around 2.5% in
1960 (4.2% in urban areas against 1.7% in rural areas), rose to more than the 3%
in the 90s. Moreover, in 1997, the growth rate of rural population was negative
(Van der Erf and Heering (2002)).
In order to characterise this migratory movement, we postulate that the rural
worker of professional category c carries out a choice in two stages: initially, he
maximizes his expected income REV Rc considering the choice of staying in Mo-
rocco (staying in rural zones or migrating to the cities) or leaving the country10:
Max REV Rc = wncNATc + wice(1−mc)EMRc
s.t.
LSRc = Brc[$cNAT (εc−1)/εcc + (1−$c)EMR(εc−1)/εcc ]εc/(εc−1) (1)
where
wnc is the national wage rate of professional category c,
NATc Moroccan rural workers of category c who decide to stay in Morocco,
wic the international wage rate of category c in foreign currency,
9The sensitivity analysis over the value of international and internal migration costs param-
eters has revealed that the main results are not affected by the value of these parameters.
10Given that in CGE models we analyse the behaviour of a representative agent, NATc and
EMRc correspond to the number of hours that the representative worker of category c chooses
to offer respectively in Morocco and abroad.
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e the nominal exchange rate,
mc international migration costs expressed as a percentage of the migra-
tory flow,
EMRc the flow of Moroccan rural emigrants of category c,
LSRc the rural population of category c,
εc the elasticity of transformation (negative).
The percentage of rural emigrants is deduced from the optimisation problem:
EMRc
NATc
= [
$c
1−$c
wice(1−mc)
wnc
]−εc (2)
In the second stage, the rural worker of category c who has decided to stay in
Morocco carries out the choice of staying in rural areas or migrating to the cities.
The potential internal migrant compares a rural job to an urban one belonging to
the same professional category. Thus, labour supply of each professional category
does not depend on the wage of the other categories. However, when he takes the
decision to migrate to urban areas, he is aware of the possibility not to find a job
there. Therefore, the expected urban wage of category c is equal to the urban
wage of this category times the probability to find a job in town. This probability
is itself equal to the ratio of total urban labour demand and total labour supply
of category c:
wac = wugc
∑
up LUc,up +
∑
pub LGc,pub
NATUc + (1− imc)MIGc + IMMIGc (3)
where
wugc is the average urban wage rate of professional category c,
LUc,up the labour demand of urban category c by urban private sector up,
LGc,pub the labour demand of urban category c by urban public sector pub,
NATUc Moroccan urban workers of category c who decide to stay in urban
areas
imc internal migration costs expressed as a percentage of the migratory
flow,
MIGc migrants of category c from rural to urban areas,
IMMIGc the stock of African immigrants of category c.
The maximization problem of this potential internal migrant is written as
follows:
Max REV Ic = wac(1− imc)MIGc + wrcNATRc
s.t.
NATc = Buc[ϑcNATR(%c−1)/%cc + (1− ϑc)MIG(%c−1)/%cc ]%c/(%c−1) (4)
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where
REV Ic is his expected income when he divides his working hours between
urban and rural areas,
wrc the rural wage rate of professional category c,
NATRc Moroccan rural workers of category c who decide to stay in rural ar-
eas,
%c the elasticity of transformation (negative).
The percentage of rural migrants to urban areas is then written:
MIGc
NATRc
= [
ϑc
1− ϑc
wac(1− imc)
wrc
]−%c (5)
The elasticity of transformation is, in absolute value, lower in equation (2)
than in equation (5), reflecting a much stronger preference of workers for their
country of origin. This is due to higher costs associated to migration abroad.
3.1.3 Migration from urban areas
At his turn, the urban worker maximizes his expected income REV Uc by choos-
ing to stay in Morocco or to migrate abroad. Given that urban markets are
imperfect, the urban worker is unable to offer all his disposable working hours.
He is considered unemployed for the hours he can not offer. Therefore, to make
his choice, he compares the international wage to the urban expected wage and
solves the following maximization problem:
Max REV Uc = wacNATUc + wice(1−mc)EMUc
s.t.
LSUc = Bic[ξcNATU (oc−1)/occ + (1− ξc)EMU (oc−1)/occ ]oc/(oc−1) (6)
where
EMUc represents Moroccan urban workers of category c who decide to emi-
grate,
LSUc the urban population of category c
oc the elasticity of transformation (negative).
The percentage of Moroccan urban workers of category c choosing to leave
their country is given by:
EMUc
NATUc
= [
ξc
1− ξc
wice(1−mc)
wac
]−oc (7)
Note that the elasticity of transformation oc is greater, in absolute value, than
the one of equation (2), reflecting less financial constraint for urban workers to
migrate abroad, compared to rural workers. It is however lower than the one of
equation (5) because the costs associated to internal migration are lower than
those associated to international migration.
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3.1.4 African immigration
To take into account the characteristics of the African immigrant, we suppose
that, when he comes to stay in Moroccan cities, he does not have the same be-
haviour of the Moroccan urban worker. He does not maximize his income by
choosing to offer his work in Morocco or abroad. He comes to work in Morocco,
fleeing war or poverty, in order to stay there definitely or to survive before mi-
grating to Spain. The decision to migrate towards Europe is taken before the
arrival to Morocco, and thus does not depend on the living conditions and on the
wage differential between Morocco and the Rest of the World. Moreover, given
that African immigration does not only occur for economic or financial reasons,
but also for personal and security reasons, living conditions in Morocco and in
particular urban wage variation will not affect Sub-Saharan immigration towards
Morocco. For this reason, we choose to exogenize the stock of African immigrants
in Morocco. This variable will be subject to a shock later on, a 10% rise of the
Sub-Saharan immigrant stock, in order to study how exogenous reasons such as
the exacerbation of poverty or conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa can exert a strong
pressure on the Moroccan economy.
In addition, the majority of these immigrants are not qualified, and if they
are, they do not occupy qualified jobs in Morocco (shoe-makers, mason assistant,
guards of private residences...). Therefore, we also assume that these African
immigrants will occupy jobs of weak qualification. They will belong to the urban
category “warehousemen and workers of small trades”. Moreover, these immi-
grants are not perfectly substitutable to local labour. The majority of them being
clandestine, they can only work in the informal sector. Thus, a company that
employs workers belonging to the above category does not pay social security
contributions on the wages assigned to African immigrants, contrary to nationals
belonging to the same category. Urban labour demand of category “10” (“ware-
housemen and workers of small trades”) by urban private sector up is a CES
function of national and foreign workers. Relative demand of foreign workers is
deduced from the wage cost minimization problem of sector up:
Min wupupLU“10”,up = (1 + cs)wu“10”NATIup + wu“10”ETRup
s.t.
LU“10”,up = Aiup[ΩupNATI
(ςup−1)/ςup
up + (1− Ωup)ETR(ςup−1)/ςupup ]ςup/(ςup−1) (8)
where
wupup is the average wage of category “10” in sector up, given by the follow-
ing equation:
wupup =
(1 + cs)wu“10”NATIup + wu“10”ETRup
LU“10”,up
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LU“10”,up the urban labour demand of category “10” by private urban sector
up,
cs social security contributions,
wuc the private urban wage of category c,
NATIup the demand of domestic workers belonging to category “10” by sec-
tor up,
ETRup the demand of foreign workers belonging to category “10” by sector
up,
ςup the elasticity of substitution between nationals and immigrants in se-
ctor up (positive).
This elasticity can be interpreted as a parameter of “repression” reflecting the
fear of the firm from being punished for having engaged informal Sub-Saharan
workers. The weaker the elasticity is, the more the repression is strong and less
the firm will change the proportion of domestic and foreign workers after the vari-
ation of their relative wage. Conversely, more the elasticity is strong, more the
repression is laxist and more the firm will be incited to engage Africans when their
relative wage decreases. The parameters of distribution Ωup and (1 − Ωup) are
then interpreted as parameters of “tolerance”, i.e. the proportions of nationals
and Sub-Saharan immigrants socially accepted for a given level of the parameter
of “repression”.
Relative demand for Sub-Saharan labour is therefore written:
ETRup
NATIup
= [(
(1− Ωup)
Ωup
)(
wu”10”(1 + cs)
wu”10”
)]ςup (9)
Social security contributions cs are fixed to 20% of the private urban wage of
each professional category. The employer pays 18,6% of the gross salary to the
Social Security for contributions to retirement and other social security covers,
and an obligatory tax of 1.6% imposed on the wage bill as a contribution to the
financing of the public system of vocational training.
Therefore, social security contributions create a gap between the wage paid
by firms and labour remuneration received by households and the Rest of the
World. They are modeled explicitly in the urban private sector and in industrial
agriculture. On the other hand, we assume that they are null in subsistence
agriculture where a significant part of labour comes from family work. In addition,
they are neglected in the public sector because if they are paid by public firms,
they are received by the agent “government” which is constituted of the Central
Government and public firms.
12
3.2 A particular treatment of the rural sector
We distinguish, within the rural sector, two types of agriculture: subsistence
agriculture and industrial agriculture. This modeling agrees perfectly with the
reality of Moroccan agriculture of which a considerable share is for subsistence11.
With agricultural production directed towards the domestic market, the subsis-
tence sector satisfies consumers final demand and its production is not used as
an intermediary input in other industries. By opposition, industrial agriculture
delivers intermediary inputs to industrial and food processing industries. It is
intended to domestic and international markets and resorts to production tech-
niques different from subsistence agriculture (transport, storage, conditioning,
quality control...). The fishing sector is associated to industrial agriculture be-
cause Moroccan fishing is primarily industrial: domestic consumption remains
very weak and is only around 6 kg/person. The canning facility corresponds to
one third of pelagic catches, the remainder being intended to flour and fish oil
production. We will also assume that subsistence agriculture uses only labour for
production, whereas industrial agriculture uses labour and capital.
As it is known, the history of Moroccan agriculture is marked by frequent pe-
riods of dryness and extreme pluviometric fluctuations. The successive drynesses
in 1981, 1983 and 1984 induced a negative growth rate of agricultural production
(-1,9% on average). Such periods are heavy on the peasants who live from land
and do not have other incomes12. Often, they will be obliged to move in order to
seek a job allowing them to mitigate the fall of their agricultural income.
What will be the impact of these variations of rural working population on
agricultural production? In principle, production should be done in the zone of
decreasing marginal productivity of the mobile factor (to the right of the inflec-
tion point in figure 1). However one can think that it is not necessarily the case.
Indeed, given that the departure of peasants into urban areas increases agricul-
tural properties (for example after the sale of lands by leaving peasants) or leads
to the abandonment of less productive pieces, the variations of rural working
population can drive us to the left of our inflection point, which is a zone where
marginal labour productivity is increasing. In the same way, the opposite move-
ment of eventual comeback of urban workers to rural areas could lead to a fall in
agricultural marginal productivity because of land bursting or the exploitation
of more arid and less productive zones.
11By definition, subsistence agriculture (also known as self sufficiency) is a method of farming
in which farmers plan to grow only enough food to feed the family farming, pay taxes, and
perhaps provide a small marketable surplus. This definition is problematic because when the
production is intended to feed the family, it will not be offered on the domestic market and there-
fore will not enter national statistics. Here, we mean by subsistence agriculture the production
of foodstuffs that uses traditional production techniques and is offered on the domestic market
in order to satisfy the representative consumer demand and not only peasants’ consumption.
12Certainly, transfers from internal and international migrants to their family in rural areas
can compensate for the loss of their agricultural income. However, given that transfers are not
only allocated to consumption but also to investment, this requires a dynamic CGE model and
not a static one, as it is the case of our model.
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Figure 1:
In order to model this phenomenon and to allow a change of regime (to pass
from a situation of increasing productivity to a situation of decreasing productiv-
ity) after the migratory movements between rural and urban areas, we adopt for
subsistence agriculture a value added function of the Weibull type13 represented
by figure 1:
V A“sa” = a(1− e−(LDR“sa”/b)f ) (10)
where
LDR“sa” is the labour demand by the subsistence agriculture sector,
a, b, f parameters in the Weibull function.
Subsistence agriculture value added being created only by labour, we can
write labour demand by this sector in the following form:
LDR“sa” =
PV“sa”V A”sa”
w“sa”
(11)
where
PV“sa” is the value added price of subsistence agriculture,
w“sa” the wage in the subsistence agriculture sector.
In other words, and contrary to industrial agriculture, all the profits of this sector
are incorporated in labour remuneration.
The parameter f is fixed to 2.2814, which corresponds to a symmetric func-
tion. In order to calibrate the parameters a and b, we must make an assumption
about the volume of labour corresponding to the inflection point. For that, let us
13This is not possible with a CES function which models a productivity either increasing, or
decreasing, but not both at the same time.
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postulate that, before any migratory movement from rural areas, labour marginal
productivity is decreasing. Once rural workers leave the countryside towards ur-
ban areas or abroad, we suppose that labour demand by subsistence agriculture
corresponds to the inflection point of figure 1.
3.3 The public sector
Contrary to production functions characterising private firms behaviour that
choose the volume of labour and capital in order to maximize their profits, we
postulate that the value added of non tradable public services is a “Leontief” com-
bination of the two factors of production. Indeed, the government as a producer
of services does not have an optimisation behaviour. Thus, for each job created in
the public sector, the government must mobilize some quantity of capital (public
buildings, etc...) and add this cost to the remuneration of civil servants. The
value added in the public sector is then written:
V Apub = KDpub/kpub (12)
and labour demand by this sector:
LDGpub = lpubV Apub (13)
where
V Apub is the value added of public sector pub,
KDpub the capital demand by public sector pub,
kpub a technical coefficient in the Leontief value added function,
LDGpub the labour demand by public sector pub,
lpub a technical coefficient in the Leontief value added function.
Moreover, we will assume that the government needs a constant proportion
of each professional category. Therefore, if the wage of engineers increases, it
cannot replace them by office workers. By postulating that labour demand of
category c by the public sector is insensitive to the variation of relative wages,
we can express total labour demand by non tradable public services as a Leontief
function of labour demand by professional categories, that is to say:
LGc,pub = LDGpublcc,pub (14)
where
LGc,pub is the labour demand of category c by public sector pub,
lcc,pub the technical coefficient of the Leontief public labour demand funct-
ion.
In tradable sectors, firms maximize their profits. Then, if the capital available
is sectoral specific, the profit or capital remuneration is residual and varies from
a sector to another. This approach is obviously irrelevant for the public sector
since the government, as a supplier of non tradable services, does not have an
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optimisation behaviour. The cost and thus the price of public services is then the
result of the combination of wage and capital costs. Consequently, we normalize
the rental rate of capital in the public sector and we calculate capital demand in
the following way:
KDpub =
PVpubV Apub − wpubLDGpub
rpub
(15)
where
PVpub is the value added price of public sector pub,
wpub the wage of public sector pub given by the following equation:
wpub =
∑
c
LGc,pubwgc
LDGpub
(16)
wgc the public wage rate of professional category c,
rpub the rental rate of capital in public sector pub.
According to the World Bank (2002), monetary compensations in the public
sector are, in Morocco, 8% higher than in the private sector. If we add to that
nonpecuniary compensations, like job security and the existence of generous pen-
sion funds, the divergence between the public and private sectors becomes larger.
According to the National Survey on Household Living Standards in 1998-1999,
this corresponds to a public wage of 1.5 to 2 times higher than private sector wage.
The existence of an important wage differential between the public and private
sectors leads to an excessive labour supply in the public sector and, in particular
for young and qualified people, waiting unemployment and a high reservation
wage. We take into account this wage differential in the calibration procedure by
postulating that:
wgc  wuc (17)
The public wage by professional category wgc is also considered exogenous. This
wage rigidity allows internal migration flows in spite of urban unemployment
rates.
3.4 Endogenization of labour supply by professional categories
The assumption of a representative agent usually used in the literature on CGE
models is not without posing conceptual difficulties when it is applied to the
household agent. Indeed, incomes and in particular labour incomes of this “house-
hold” come from the participation of a multitude of individuals to different labour
markets. In our model, wage rates are different between categories and the in-
crease in the wage rate of a professional category does not induce necessarily a
fall in labour supply of another category. In other words, the concepts of cross
elasticities loose their significance when the representative agent is composed of
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individuals having different qualifications.
In order to solve this problem, Decaluwe´, Lemelin, Bahan and Annabi (2005)
proposed to describe each representative household as a group of individuals,
each one belonging to a professional category and exerting only one profession.
Each individual of this group maximizes its utility independently from the others,
taking into account its own preference for leisure. Thus, labour supply of each
member (or each professional category) is independent from the wage rate of the
other members (or categories) and thus the opportunity cost of leisure differs
between members. This approach is similar to a particular case of the collective
household model (Chiappori 1992) where the decision process is carried out in
two stages: initially, income - here non-labour income - is divided between house-
hold members. Then, each member maximizes his utility independently from the
others.
We follow this approach and postulate that the individual carries out an ar-
bitration between the time allocated to work and the time allocated to leisure.
Given that leisure is considered as a normal good, its opportunity cost is equal,
in presence of unemployment, to the expected wage rate of the corresponding
professional category, which is the product of the wage rate by the probability of
being employed. In other words, we suppose that unemployment on urban labour
market c affects proportionally all individuals who offer this type of work. When
the expected wage increases, an income effect and a substitution effect come into
play. On one hand, the rise in wage rate increases the leisure opportunity cost,
and therefore the individual raises his labour supply. This is the substitution
effect. On the other hand, the rise in wage rate induces an increase in the con-
sumption of all goods, including leisure (a normal good), and consequently a fall
in labour supply. This is the income effect. The final effect on labour supply
depends on the extent of the two effects: if the substitution effect dominates,
the labour supply curve is increasing. If the income effect is greater than the
substitution effect, the labour supply curve is decreasing. It is called “Backward-
bending” (Hanoch 1965). It will have the form of figure 2. For our simulations,
we will assume that the substitution effect dominates and that the labour supply
curve has a positive slope review!!!!.
The consumer carries out initially the choice between the consumption of
goods and the consumption of leisure, using an ELES function14. In order to
define the optimisation problem of household’s member c using a Stone-Geary
utility function, it is necessary to separate between household members the min-
imum level of consumption of each good and service i as well as the non-labour
14Extended Linear Expenditure System (Lluch 1973). The ELES demand function is obtained
from a static maximization problem of the Stone-Geary function, considering savings as a good
with a null minimum consumption. In our problem of labour supply endogenization, we replace
savings by leisure and we consider that the household must also consume a minimum level of
leisure (De Melo and Tarr 1992, Deaton and Muellbauer 1980).
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income. Let λc be the share of household’s member c, with
λc =
wc
∑
j LDc,j∑
c (wc
∑
j LDc,j)
and
∑
c
λc = 1.
The optimisation problem of household’s member c is written:
Max Uc =
∑
i
mi,cln(Ci,c − λcCmini) + βcln(TNLc − TNLminc)
s.t.
∑
i
PCiCi,c = (1− ψ)(1− ty × adj)wc
∑
j
LDc,j +
λc(1− ψ)(1− ty × adj)[Y −
∑
c
(wc
∑
j
LDc,j)]
= prlc(Tc − TNLc) + λc(1− ψ)(1− ty × adj)[Y −
∑
c
(wc
∑
j
LDc,j)]
where
Uc is the utility of household’s member c,
mi,c the budgetary share of good i in the supernumerary income of member c,
Ci,c member c’s consumption of good i,
Cmini household’s minimum consumption of good i,
βc the leisure share in member c’s income,
TNLc the leisure time of member c,
TNLminc the minimum leisure time of member c,
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PCi the composite price of good i,
ψ the marginal (and average) propensity to save applied uniformly to all
household members,
ty the direct tax rate on household income applied uniformly to all house-
hold members,
adj a compensatory tax,
wc the wage of professional category c,
LDc,j the labour demand of professional category c by sector j,
Y the total income of the representative household,
prlc the leisure opportunity cost of member c given by:
prlc = (1− ψ)(1− ty × adj)(1− uc)wc
uc the unemployment rate of professional category c,
Tc the total available time for member c,
The equations of goods and services demand and leisure demand become:
Ci,c = λcCmini +
mi,c
(1− βc)PCi (
∑
i
PCiCi,c −
∑
i
PCiλcCmini) (18)
and
TNLc = TNLminc +
βc
(1− βc)prlc (
∑
i
PCiCi,c −
∑
i
PCiλcCmini) (19)
From the equality TNLc−TNLminc = lsmaxc−LS, where lsmaxc is household’s
member c maximum time available to work, and from equation (19), we deduce
the labour supply function of professional category c:
LSc = lsmaxc − βc(1− βc)prlc (
∑
i
PCiCi,c −
∑
i
PCiλcCmini) (20)
In the three previous equations, we replace
∑
i PCiCi,c by its value given in the
optimisation problem.
Because we are taking into account two segments of the labour market, rural
and urban, each one divided in ten under categories according to the different
professional categories, we distinguish two equations of labour supply, one for the
rural market applied to all rural professions and one for the urban market applied
to all urban professions:
NATRc = lsmaxc − βc(1− βc)prlc (
∑
i
PCiCi,c − λc
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hr”) (21)
where∑
i
PCiCi,c = (1− ψ“hr”)(1− ty“hr”adj)wrc
∑
ru
LRc,ru +
λc(1− ψ“hr”)(1− ty“hr”adj)[Y“hr” −
∑
c
(wrc
∑
ru
LRc,ru)](22)
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in rural areas. For the urban areas, this equation is more complex because the
representative urban household is composed of Moroccans having decided to stay
in urban areas, but also of rural migrants towards the cities and Sub-Saharan
immigrants. The labour income of these migrants is added to the integral income
of the representative household and is used for consumption and saving ends. For
lack of information on the consumption behaviour of these migrants and on the
proportion that is employed, we must make an assumption about the fraction
of the consumption budget and labour income that come from the participation
of these individuals to the urban household. For that, we postulate that this
fraction is equal to the proportion of internal migrants and African immigrants
in the labour supply of each category.
NATUc = lsmax′c −
β′c
(1− β′c)pluc
(1− ζ1c − ζ2c)(
∑
i
PCiC
′
i,c − λ′c
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hu”)(23)
where
ζ1c =
(1− imc)MIGc
NATUc + (1− imc)MIGc + IMMIGc
ζ2c =
IMMIGc
NATUc + (1− imc)MIGc + IMMIGc∑
i
PCiC
′
i,c = (1− ψ“hu”)(1− ty“hu”adj)(wuc
∑
up
LUc,up + wgc
∑
pub
LGc,pub) +
λ′c(1− ψ“hu”)(1− ty“hu”adj)[Y“hu” −
∑
c
(wuc
∑
up
LUc,up + wgc
∑
pub
LGc,pub)](24)
Now, rural household demand of good i is written:
CTi,“hr” =
∑
c
λcCmini,“hr” +
∑
c
mi,c
(1− βc)PCi (
∑
i
PCiCi,c − λc
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hr”)(25)
and urban household demand (excluding the consumption of internal and African
immigrants):
CTi,“hu” =
∑
c
(1− ζ1c − ζ2c)[λ′cCmini,“hu” +
m′i,c
(1− β′c)PCi
(
∑
i
PCiC
′
i,c − λ′c
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hu”)](26)
For lack of data on consumption and income elasticity of household members
that are necessary to calibrate the budgetary share of each one of them, we
suppose, as in Decaluwe´ et al. (2005), that all household members distribute
their supernumerary consumption budget in the same proportions, whatever their
leisure budgetary share is. In other words, the fractions
mi,c
(1− βc) and
m′i,c
(1− β′c)
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are the same between all members of rural and urban households, they are inde-
pendent of the professional category to which the individual belongs. Thus, rural
household demand of good i is written:
CTi,“hr” = Cmini,“hr” +
γi,“hr”
PCi
(BC“hr” −
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hr”) (27)
and urban household demand (excluding the consumption of internal and African
immigrants):
CTi,“hu” =
∑
c
(1− ζ1c − ζ2c)[λ′cCmini,“hu” +
γi,“hu”
PCi
(
∑
i
PCiC
′
i,c − λ′c
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hu”)]
where BC“hr” et BC“hu” are respectively the consumption budgets of rural and
urban households.
After the internal migrants and African immigrants enter the urban house-
hold, they will participate to the maximisation problem of this household. Urban
household consumption (including that of internal and African immigrants) will
be written:
CTi,“hu” = Cmini,“hu” +
γi,“hu”
PCi
(BC“hu” −
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hu”)
3.5 Labour market equilibrium
In Morocco, like in the majority of developing countries, unemployment is a
characteristic phenomenon of urban labour market. Therefore, a realistic repre-
sentation of this market must take unemployment into account in equilibrium, in
contrast with the bulk of the CGE literature.
We rely here on a Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) type approach. Using in-
ternational microeconomic data on more than twelve developed nations, Blanch-
flower and Oswald identified a negative relation between the wage rate and the
unemployment rate implying that, other things equal, if the unemployment rate
of a particular region increases during a year, the corresponding workers will see
their wage rate decreasing. Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) showed that the
relation between wage and unemployment rates is stable among countries and
through time with an elasticity around -0.1. We follow this approach (figure 3)
in order to model urban unemployment by professional categories and make the
assumption that this elasticity does not depend on the level of development of
the country15:
ln
wuc
Pindex
= Dc − 0.1 lnuc (28)
15We perform a sensitivity analysis on alternative values of the wage elasticity. No substantial
changes are detected. For wage and unemployment rates, the variables of our interest, the sign
of their variation is the same as before.
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Figure 3:
where
uc is the unemployment rate of category c compatible with the corresp-
onding wage rate wuc,
Pindex the GDP deflator, nume´raire,
Dc fixed effects related to the regions and to the industries in question,
as well as the whole characteristics of workers (age, sex, education...).
On the other hand, rural labour markets are competitive. Equilibrium occurs
when:
NATRc =
∑
ru
LRc,ru (29)
with NATRc being the rural labour supply by professional category c and LRc,ru
the labour demand of category c by rural sector ru.
4 Simulation experiments
4.0.1 A 10% drop in migration costs
We first ask how an increase in migration will impact the various segments of
the Moroccan labour market. To address this issue, we simulate the impact of a
10% fall in migration costs mc and imc. Such a shock can be interpreted as a
translation of a larger facility for the migrant to become operational, for example
because of a fall in migration costs, or a larger simplification and transparency of
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administrative procedures, or the existence of migrants networks that facilitate
integration in the host country.
The reduction in migration costs affects simultaneously rural and urban mi-
gration, and internal migration. We are obviously interested in the level of labour
remuneration and in the evolution of unemployment rates by professional cate-
gories.
First of all, we expect that the fall in migration costs accelerates emigra-
tion, reduces labour supply of the corresponding urban workers and their unem-
ployment rate, given that other things are equal. On the other hand, internal
migration towards cities, also facilitated by the drop in migration costs, should
increase labour supply and, ceteris paribus, the corresponding unemployment
rates. If these two migratory flows coexist, the final effect on unemployment
rates by professional categories and consequently on urban wages is ambiguous.
The results of Table 4 indicate that in the Moroccan case, the fall in labour
supply due to urban emigration is more than compensated by the increase in
internal migratory flows. Thus, unemployment rates of all categories, except for
“senior executive...” and “commercants...”, increase and their wage decreases.
Unemployment rates of “farmers...” and “workmen and farm labourers...” in-
crease more (9.64% and 9.56% respectively), inducing the strongest fall in their
wages. Those of “senior executive...” and “commercants...” diminish by 0.05%
and 0.2% respectively, despite the rise of labour supply, leading to a higher wage.
Indeed, labour supply LSc of these two categories increases, despite the absence of
internal migration pressure on their markets, because urban emigration induces a
rise of their wages. Consequently, their leisure opportunity cost goes up and the
corresponding workers increase their labour supply NATUc. In spite of the rise
in labour supply, their unemployment rates decrease because the sectors using
them intensively (such as mining industry, chemical industry, rubber industry,
electricity and water, construction, trade and repair, financial and non financial
services) expand and thus increase their labour demand.
Finally, only “senior executive...” and “commercants...” staying in urban areas
seem to profit from the emigration of their counterparts, which agrees with the
literature (Lucas, 1987; Lucas, 2005)16. Migrants, whatever they were employed
or not before their departure, yield their place to workers initially not employed,
inducing a fall of unemployment and an increase in wages. On the other hand,
and contrary to what is predicted in the literature, the other urban labour cate-
gories are losing17.
16Lucas (2005) showed that, in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, workers migration
has not induced a loss of production or a rise of wages. He gave different explanations to this
stylised fact such as the possibility that those who have migrated did not have a job before
leaving. Therefore, their departure generated a fall of unemployment rate. On the other hand,
in Pakistan, workers emigration towards the Gulf countries has exerted an upper pressure on
wages. A rise of wages has also been noticed in Philippines. Lucas (1987) arrived to the same
conclusion in Mozambique and Malawi after workers emigration towards South African mines.
17Since “workmen and farm labourers...” constitute a negligible share of urban employment,
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In rural areas, we observe an increase in wages because rural emigration and
migration towards the cities (facilitated by the fall in migration costs) reduce
labour supply on each rural market. Only internal migration of “workmen and
farm labourers...” decreases. This is by the drop in the expected urban wage (net
of migration costs) of this category relatively to its rural wage. But international
emigration of these workers is enough to reduce their labour supply on the corre-
sponding rural market. When labour supply diminishes, the wage rate increases
ceteris paribus, in order to reequilibrate the corresponding market. International
migratory movements and internal movements towards Moroccan cities create a
scarcity of labour on rural markets and push upward labour remunerations. On
the contrary, two forces of opposed directions are expressed on urban markets:
departure of workers towards foreign countries and internal migration from rural
to urban areas. By consequence, wage evolution is ambiguous.
Rural household welfare, measured by the equivalent variation, increases by
30 million dirhams, that is to say 0.033% of his initial income, because workers
staying in rural areas profit from the wage increase after the migration of their
counterparts. On the other hand, urban household welfare decreases by 21 million
dirhams, or 0.010% of his initial income, because urban wages of the majority
of workers fall after the different types of migratory movements affecting urban
labour markets.
Table 4- Shock 1: Percentage change in unemployment and wage rates,
migratory flows and urban labour supply by professional categories
Categories uc wuc EMUc MIGc LSc wrc EMRc
Directors 0.2175 −0.0217 2.2707 2.5993 0.0047 0.0682 1.7847
Senior executive −0.0518 0.0052 2.25 0 0.0009 0 0
Junior staff 0.1195 −0.0119 2.2773 2.5914 0.0044 0.0682 1.7832
Employees 0.0594 −0.0059 2.2717 2.5993 0.0082 0.0682 1.782
Commercants −0.1971 0.0197 2.1991 0 0.0014 0 0
Farmers, fishermen 9.6414 −0.9162 4.2041 0.2198 0.0939 0.0664 1.6896
Craftsmen 0.1836 −0.0183 2.322 2.5373 0.0129 0.0682 1.768
Farm labourers 9.559 −0.9088 4.5358 −0.1778 −0.1466 0.0667 1.6178
Drivers 0.1746 −0.0174 2.3065 2.5552 0.0148 0.0679 1.7696
Warehousemen 0.3735 −0.0373 2.4011 2.4423 0.0446 0.067 1.9328
Table 4bis- Shock 1: Absolute change in wage rates (in Moroccan
it is perfectly true to think that these workers, who migrate massively to the cities, will change
their professional category and will belong for example to the category “warehousemen and
workers of small trades”. However, given that the pressure on the market of “warehousemen
and workers of small trades” increases with the fall of migration costs, the reception of workers
belonging to the category “workmen and farm labourers...” will do nothing but exacerbate the
pressure on this market. Thus, our contradictory results with the literature on the impact of
migration on unemployment are still verified.
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Dirhams), unemployment rates, urban labour supply and migration flows (in
millions of working hours)
Categories uc wuc EMUc MIGc LSc wrc EMRc
Directors 0.04786 −0.00022 0.15895 0.05199 0.10000 0.00068 0.01785
Senior executive −0.00881 0.00005 0.24750 0 0.00000 0 0
Junior staff 0.07289 −0.00012 0.72873 0.23323 0.30000 0.00068 0.05350
Employees 0.06651 −0.00006 1.61293 0.90975 1.10000 0.00068 0.19602
Commercants −0.06308 0.00020 0.81368 0 0.10000 0 0
Farmers, fishermen 0.28924 −0.00916 0.16817 1.12773 1.00000 0.00066 2.61886
Craftsmen 0.18548 −0.00018 3.25084 3.70445 4.20000 0.00068 0.77794
Farm labourers 1.91179 −0.00909 0.22679 −1.77751 −1.60000 0.00067 6.45484
Drivers 0.14844 −0.00017 0.50743 0.74102 0.70000 0.00068 0.14157
Warehousemen 0.44815 −0.00037 2.76130 11.62516 11.40000 0.00067 0.88910
4.0.2 A 10% rise in Sub-Saharan immigrant stock
We now ask what is the impact of the South-South migration on the Moroccan
labour market. The difficulty for African countries to ameliorate the welfare of
their populations and the multiplication of conflicts let think that migratory flows
originated from Sub-Saharan Africa will not be over soon. For that, we simulate
the impact of a 10% rise in the stock of Sub-Saharan clandestine immigrants.
This surge of clandestine migrants deteriorates the situation of Moroccan urban
labour market, and can exert a pressure on the other migratory movements, those
from rural areas to the cities or to foreign countries, or urban emigration. One
can thus expect an increase in urban emigration due to the rise of unemployment
and the decrease of urban wage. Simultaneously this exit of urban workers re-
duces, at its turn, the pressure exerted by immigration on urban labour market,
and increases wages.
As one can note in Table 5, the increase in Sub-Saharan immigration creates
a pressure on the urban labour market of “warehousemen and workers of small
trades”. This category absorbs all the entries of Sub-Saharan immigrants, qual-
ified or not. Given that other things are equal, the unemployment rate of these
workers increases and induces ceteris paribus a fall in their urban wage. Moroc-
can urban workers belonging to the same category are thus incited to leave the
country whereas rural workers are incited to stay in rural areas. Let us notice
however that in the Moroccan case, the fall of internal migration and the rise of
urban emigration do not compensate the entry of African immigrants. Indeed, the
unemployment rate of these workers increases by 0.72% and their wage decreases.
This wage variation induces indirect effects on the other urban markets. In-
deed, urban sectors increase their demand of “warehousemen and workers of small
trades” (nationals and foreign in the same proportion) because their wage falls
and the production of the sectors intensive in this category of workers expands
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(especially mining, textile, clothing and chemical industries, construction ser-
vices, hotels and restaurants, transport and telecommunication that are the most
intensive in this type of labour). Given that capital is sector-specific, the increase
in production should induce, on its turn, a rise in labour demand of the other
categories, reduce their unemployment rate and increase their urban wage. This
is the case of all categories except “farmers...”, “workmen and farm labourers...”
and “drivers and assembly workers...”. Let us examine now the evolution of rural
wages that affects the decision to migrate towards the cities and consequently the
urban labour supply of the other categories.
Given that other things are equal, the nominal exchange rate depreciation
(which increases the value of the foreign wage in local currency) should moti-
vate rural workers of all categories to migrate. At constant rural population,
this should induce a fall in Moroccan population wishing to stay in its country
and consequently a reduction in labour supply on the different rural markets.
Since these markets are competitive, rural wages will rise. This discourage rural
workers of all categories to migrate to urban areas. In addition, rural workers
belonging to the categories “farmers...” and “workmen and farm labourers...”
revise downward their decision to emigrate because the wage increase compen-
sates the stimulating effect of the exchange rate depreciation. Urban emigration,
also motivated by the nominal exchange rate depreciation, and the decrease of
internal migration towards the cities reduce labour supply of all professional cat-
egories. Consequently, unemployment rates of all categories except “drivers and
assembly workers” decrease and the corresponding wages increase. The unem-
ployment rate of “drivers and assembly workers” increases because labour demand
of these workers decreases more than their labour supply. The reason why labour
demand of “drivers and assembly workers” falls is that the production of the sec-
tors “machines and equipment manufacturing”, “radio and TV equipment” and
“car industry” is negatively affected by the drop of total internal demand ad-
dressed to them. Finally, let us note that urban emigration of “senior executive”,
“commercants...”, “farmers...” and “workmen and farm labourers...” decreases
because the nominal exchange rate depreciation does not compensate the rise of
the average urban wage of these categories.
We have just seen how the entry of workers on a specific urban labour mar-
ket stimulates the emigration of the corresponding workers. However, emigration
does not succeed to reduce the pressure on this market. Moreover, this entry of
workers induces indirectly a variation in migratory flows on the other markets
through wage variation.
The positive evolution of urban wages of the majority of categories induces a
rise in labour remuneration of the urban household, and ceteris paribus, a rise in
his total income. Therefore, their welfare measured by the equivalent variation,
increases by 6 million dirhams, or 0.003% of their initial income. In the same
way, the rise of rural wages of all professional categories gives place to an increase
in rural household income and to an improvement of his welfare. His equivalent
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variation is of 3 million dirhams, or 0.004% of his initial income.
The growth impact, measured by the variation of real GNP, is positive (a rise
of 0.002%) and it is mainly due to the expansion of sectoral production. Indeed,
despite the positive evolution of wages, the firms in all sectors (except “machines
and equipment manufacturing”, “radio and TV equipment” and “car industry”)
benefit from the increase in consumers demand in order to rise their production.
Moreover, since any increase in interior demand is satisfied by domestic and
imported, total import volume increases. Exports must also increase in order
to maintain current surplus fixed. The depreciation of the real exchange rate is
therefore necessary.
Table 5- Shock 2: Percentage change in unemployment and wage rates,
migratory flows and urban labour supply by professional categories
Categories uc wuc EMUc MIGc LSc wrc EMRc
Directors −0.0192 0.0019 0.004 −0.0219 −0.0003 0.0095 0.0023
Senior executive −0.1009 0.0101 −0.0007 0 −0.0002 0 0
Junior staff −0.0052 0.0005 0.0044 −0.0225 −0.0003 0.0095 0.0026
Employees −0.0177 0.0018 0.0009 −0.0189 −0.0009 0.0095 0.0029
Commercants −0.0922 0.0092 −0.0187 0 0.0000 0 0
Farmers, fishermen −0.0427 0.0043 −0.0033 −0.0181 −0.0082 0.0115 −0.013
Craftsmen −0.0027 0.0003 0.0043 −0.0223 −0.0003 0.0095 0.0014
Farm labourers −0.0533 0.0053 −0.0074 −0.0123 −0.0101 0.0112 −0.0128
Drivers 0.003 −0.0003 0.0063 −0.0256 −0.0004 0.0098 0.0015
Warehousemen 0.7189 −0.0716 0.2872 −0.3783 0.1402 0.0108 0.0193
Table 5bis- Shock 2: Absolute change in wage rates (in Moroccan
Dirhams), unemployment rates, urban labour supply and migration flows (in
millions of working hours)
Categories uc wuc EMUc MIGc LSc wrc EMRc
Directors −0.00423 0.00002 0.00028 −0.00044 0.00000 0.00009 0.00002
Senior executive −0.01715 0.00010 −0.00008 0 0.00000 0 0
Junior staff −0.00316 0.00001 0.00141 −0.00203 0.00000 0.00009 0.00008
Employees −0.01980 0.00002 0.00065 −0.00661 −0.10000 0.00009 0.00032
Commercants −0.02950 0.00009 −0.00692 0 0.00000 0 0
Farmers, fishermen −0.00128 0.00004 −0.00013 −0.09273 −0.10000 0.00012 −0.02022
Craftsmen −0.00269 0.00000 0.00598 −0.03254 −0.10000 0.00009 0.00063
Farm labourers −0.01065 0.00005 −0.00037 −0.12271 −0.10000 0.00011 −0.05103
Drivers 0.00259 0.00000 0.00138 −0.00743 0.00000 0.00010 0.00012
Warehousemen 0.86270 −0.00072 0.33028 −1.80093 35.80000 0.00011 0.00889
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4.0.3 The simultaneous impact of a 10% drop in migration costs and
a 10% rise in Sub-Saharan immigrant stock
We must now consider an experiment reflecting the actual shocks to the Moroc-
can labour market, containing the two previous elements. Since the two previous
shocks induce a greater pressure on the labour market of “warehousemen and
workers of small trades”, their simultaneous effect consists, as expected, in a
stronger rise of unemployment (of 1.09% against 0.37% and 0.72% respectively
during the first and second shocks18). Since the unemployment rate of this cat-
egory rises more, the corresponding urban wage falls more and urban sectors
express a stronger labour demand of this category. Given that other things
are equal, sectors intensive in this type of labour expand more (especially min-
ing, textile, clothing, and chemical industries, construction services, hotels and
restaurants, transports and telecommunication). These sectors will also require
additional workers belonging to the other categories, and this could reduce the
pressure exerted by internal migration on some labour markets. We notice that
the rise of labour demand and urban emigration flows of “directors...”, “junior
staff”, “employees” “farmers...” and “craftsmen...” reduce the pressure exerted
by internal migration but do not succeed to reduce unemployment rates of the
previous categories. They evolve positively but their variation is less than the
one resulting from the first shock (i.e. the reduction in migration costs). On the
other hand, the unemployment rate of “drivers...” increases under the simultane-
ous impact of internal migration and the indirect effect of African immigration
that induces a rise of their unemployment. Finally, the increase of labour de-
mand and urban emigration of “senior executive...” and “commercants...” cause
a stronger fall of their unemployment rates. All urban wage rates vary in the
opposite sign of unemployment rates.
Rural wages increase more under the simultaneous effect of the drop in mi-
gration costs and the increase in Sub-Saharan immigration: indeed, the fall in
migration costs stimulates rural emigration (direct effect) and Sub-Saharan im-
migration induces indirectly an exchange rate depreciation favourable to rural
emigration (indirect effect).
The positive evolution of rural household equivalent variation is accentuated
with respect to the previous shocks due to the higher rise of rural wages acting
on rural household income. Welfare is improved by 33 million dirhams (against
30 millions and 3 millions before), that is to say 0.037% of his initial income.
For urban household, the deterioration of welfare at the first shock is reduced
because his welfare improves during the second shock. It ends up decreasing by
15 million dirhams (instead of 21 millions during first shock), or 0.007% of his
initial income.
18Since the evolution of most variables in the last simulation is generally the sum of the
variations of the same variable in the two previous shocks, one may think of a shock linearity.
However, we can show that this is mainly due to the weak intensity of the selected shocks: a
stronger fall of migration costs is sufficient to eliminate the apparent linearity.
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Table 6- Shock 3: Percentage change in unemployment and wage rates,
migratory flows and urban labour supply by professional categories
Categories uc wuc EMUc MIGc LSc wrc EMRc
Directors 0.1984 −0.0198 2.2748 2.5770 0.0044 0.0776 1.7870
Senior executive −0.1521 0.0152 2.2493 0 0.0007 0 0
Junior staff 0.1143 −0.0114 2.2818 2.5684 0.0041 0.0776 1.7858
Employees 0.0418 −0.0042 2.2727 2.5801 0.0073 0.0776 1.7849
Commercants −0.2887 0.0289 2.1801 0 0.0015 0 0
Farmers, fishermen 9.5948 −0.9120 4.2007 0.2019 0.0858 0.0779 1.6764
Craftsmen 0.1810 −0.0181 2.3264 2.5146 0.0126 0.0776 1.7695
Farm labourers 9.5019 −0.9036 4.5281 −0.1899 −0.1566 0.0779 1.6048
Drivers 0.1777 −0.0177 2.3129 2.5291 0.0144 0.0777 1.7711
Warehousemen 1.0914 −0.1085 2.6946 2.0556 0.1845 0.0778 1.9512
Table 6bis- Shock 3: Absolute change in wage rates (in Moroccan
Dirhams), unemployment rates, urban labour supply and migration flows (in
millions of working hours)
Categories uc wuc EMUc MIGc LSc wrc EMRc
Directors 0.04364 −0.00020 0.15923 0.05154 0.10000 0.00078 0.01787
Senior executive −0.02586 0.00015 0.24742 0 0.00000 0 0
Junior staff 0.06975 −0.00011 0.73016 0.23116 0.30000 0.00078 0.05357
Employees 0.04680 −0.00004 1.61359 0.90302 0.90000 0.00078 0.19634
Commercants −0.09238 0.00029 0.80664 0 0.10000 0 0
Farmers, fishermen 0.28785 −0.00912 0.16803 1.03554 0.90000 0.00078 2.59840
Craftsmen 0.18280 −0.00018 3.25692 3.67128 4.10000 0.00078 0.77857
Farm labourers 1.90038 −0.00904 0.22641 −1.89935 −1.70000 0.00078 6.40330
Drivers 0.15100 −0.00018 0.50883 0.73345 0.70000 0.00078 0.14169
Warehousemen 1.30966 −0.00108 3.09877 9.78466 47.10000 0.00078 0.89755
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we are interested in a particular shutter of the relation between
migration and economic development of the sending country. We paid attention
to the relation between migration and unemployment by professional categories,
which is little exploited in the literature. Moreover, all the proposed analysis
do not treat, to our knowledge, more than one type of migratory flow (partic-
ularly emigration from the country of origin). The originality of our work is to
take simultaneously into account three types of migratory flows characterising
a country having a long history with migration: Morocco. The following flows
are considered: rural and urban emigration, internal migration towards the cities
and Sub-Saharan immigration (towards Moroccan cities). Each one of these mi-
gratory flows has different effects on urban labour market and does not affect
29
equally all the professional categories. Urban emigration reduces unemployment
rates and increases wages. On the other hand, Sub-Saharan immigration and
internal migration increase unemployment rates and reduce wages. If these flows
coexist, the final effect on unemployment and wage rates is ambiguous: this is
the interest of our analysis.
Our results obtained from a CGE model of the Moroccan economy, calibrated
on the SAM of the year 1998, attests to the expected ambiguity of the impact of
these three migratory flows on wage and unemployment rates. In the first simula-
tion where migration costs decrease, the increase in internal migration upsets the
expected effects associated to urban emigration, such as the fall in unemployment
and the rise in wage rate. In the second simulation, Sub-Saharan immigration
affects indirectly the urban labour market of the other categories, by modify-
ing their unemployment rates, wages and emigration flows. But the variation of
emigration induced by the exchange rate depreciation does not lead to the ex-
pected effects on unemployment rates of all the professions because it is thwarted
by the evolution of the other variables in the model. In the third simulation,
we run simultaneously the two previous shocks since they will coexist in the fu-
ture and will lead to different results. The effects on unemployment and wage
rates of urban emigration do not correspond, once again, to what is awaited, be-
cause of the existence of other migratory flows affecting the urban labour market.
Currently, the debates on migration evoke that a good management of migra-
tory policies can generate important profits to the sending and receiving countries.
The results of migration impact on Morocco show that it is dangerous to set up
migratory policies without having a global vision of all migratory flows existing
and the way in which they affect labour market and the remainder of the econ-
omy. In particular, we saw that the expected effect of urban emigration can be
upset by the impact of another flow entering urban labour market. By compar-
ing the three previous scenarios, we find that a rise of Sub-Saharan immigration
is not such harmful to welfare. Urban household welfare is largely improved. It
becomes positive. On the other hand, the amelioration of rural household welfare
is reduced. In addition, the last scenario is the best in terms of welfare for rural
household.
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APPENDIX 1
DATA
The social accounting matrix (SAM) constitutes the empirical database re-
quired to satisfy the accounting coherence of a CGE model. We use the Moroc-
can SAM built by Touhami Abdelkhalek and Nouzha Zaoujal (2004) for the year
1998 from several Moroccan data sources: the Input-Output table of the Mo-
roccan economy for 1998, built by the Direction of Statistics and published, in a
preliminary version, in 2002, the National Survey on Household Living Standards
in 1998-1999 (NSHLS) carried out by the Direction of Statistics, documents from
the Ministry of Economy and Finance, from External Trade department, from
the Ministry of Agriculture, from Foreign Exchange department, and from Bank
Al-Maghrib. The SAM gathers two factors of production (labour and capital),
four types of agents (Households, Firms, Government, the Rest of the World), 34
sectors of activity that correspond exactly to those of the Input-Output table of
the Moroccan economy in 1998.
In order to distinguish between rural and urban areas, we need to take into
consideration two types of households and two types of production factors, rural
labour offered by rural household and urban labour offered by urban household.
All household accounts must be adjusted in order to distinguish, from now on,
between two representative households:
1- The submatrix of transfers is distributed between the two households according
to weights calculated essentially from the Moroccan SAM built for the IMMPA19
project of the World Bank.
2- Labour remuneration going to rural household comes only from rural labour
and the one going to urban household comes only from urban labour.
3- The NSHLS of 2001 provides percentages on the distribution of total consump-
tion between rural and urban households. These percentages are respectively
around 0.3% and 0.7% of total consumption. In addition, the NSHLS publishes
percentages on the distribution of rural and urban households’ consumption be-
tween the different aggregated sectors of activity. From these percentages, differ-
ent calculations are made in order to quantify the distribution of rural and urban
households’ consumption according to the 34 sectors of the Input-Output table.
4- According to the NSHLS of 2001, the distribution of consumption expenditures
would be a good approximation of the distribution of total income between rural
and urban households. Thus, we suppose that rural household income constitutes
0.3% of households total income and urban household income constitutes 0.7%
of households total income.
19Integrated Macroeconomic Model for Poverty Analysis.
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The distinction between rural and urban areas should also be done in terms
of production. The agricultural and fishing sectors are supposed to constitute
the rural sector, and all the remaining sectors, including the public ones, are
supposed to form the urban sector. Indeed, as we have just seen in section 2,
agriculture absorbs 80.2% of rural employment while industry and services ab-
sorb 77.5% of urban employment. The public sector employs mainly townsmen,
that is 17.3% of total employment in the cities against only 1.9% in the campaigns.
Rural employment, given in terms of our matrix by the sum of labour demand
by the agricultural and fishing sectors is around 3,166 workers. On the other
hand, urban sectors employ 103,996 workers. This implies that rural employ-
ment is not more than 3% of total employment whereas in reality, it corresponds
to the half of national employment. According to Harrison et al. (2003), capital
remuneration is overestimated in the agricultural sector because it is calculated
residually from the production value after deducing labour remuneration and the
cost of intermediary consumption. However, the agricultural sector uses generally
family work and informal labour that are not computed in input-output tables.
Therefore, given that agricultural work is underestimates, capital remuneration
is overestimated. This is why agricultural and fishing sectors seem to be capital
intensive whereas they should be labour intensive. The basic SAM should be
adjusted in order to make rural sectors labour intensive while having a positive
(although weak) capital demand.
We further disaggregate our SAM in order to take into account the different
professional categories. There is ten categories listed in Morocco. These cat-
egories exist in urban and rural areas. We then find ourselves with 20 labour
markets. We use the national survey of the Direction of Statistics on activity,
employment and unemployment in 1999 in order to distribute rural and urban
employment between professional categories. The only difference is that we as-
sume that there is no “commercants...” in rural areas because they work primarily
in trade services that belong to the urban sector and are consumed as interme-
diary inputs by the rural sector.
Finally, since we analyse the impact of migration on labour market, we need
data on Moroccan emigration towards foreign countries, on rural-urban migration
and on Sub-Saharan immigration:
1- For lack of data on Moroccan emigration, we resort to the data published by
the OECD in 2006 on immigrant inflows by nationality in some OECD countries.
More specifically, we approximate Moroccan emigration by the flows of Moroccan
migrants to their traditional destinations in 1999, such as Belgium, France, Italy,
the Netherlands and Spain. The sum of these flows is reported to the Moroccan
working population of 1999 in order to calculate the annual percentage of emi-
grants.
2- According to a report of the International Organization of Migration, Moroc-
can emigration towards European countries is more originated from rural areas.
We suppose that 60% of the national emigration flow take place from rural areas
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and 40% from urban areas.
3- Age´nor and El Aynaoui (2003) point out that each year, around 200,000 work-
ers migrate from rural to urban areas. This corresponds approximately to 3.7%
of the rural working population of 1999.
4- Data collection on African immigrants to Morocco is the most difficult task
because the majority of these immigrants are clandestine. According to Lahlou
(2003), there would be between 6,000 and 15,000 clandestine immigrants, but
these estimates are uncertain. We retain the upper bound. This number is re-
ported to the urban working population of 1999 in order to calculate the stock
of immigrants corresponding to our matrix.
5- Finally, for lack of data on migration by professional categories, we suppose
that the number of rural/urban migrants belonging to a professional category
is proportional to the share of this category in rural/urban total employment.
We have also simulated the previous shocks with an equal distribution of mi-
grant flows between professional categories but we have not detected substantial
changes in the main results.
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APPENDIX 2
ABBREVIATION OF SECTORS AND PROFESSIONAL CATEGORIES
Sectors
SA subsistence agriculture
IA industrial agriculture
MII mining industry
FOO food industry
TOB tobacco industry
TEX textile industry
CLO clothing industry
LEA leather and shoes industry
WOO fabrication of wood and wood-based products
PAP paper industry
EDI edition, printing and reproduction
OIL oil refining
CHE chemical industry
RUB rubber and plastic industry
MIN manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
MET metallurgy
MEP metal processing
MAC machines and equipment manufacturing
OFF office machinery
RAD radio and TV equipment
MED medical instruments manufacturing
CAR car industry
TRM manufacture of other transport means
FUR furniture manufacturing, other industries
ELE electricity and water - production and distribution
CON construction
TRR trade and repair
HOT hotels and restaurants
TRA transports and telecommunication
FIN financial activities and insurance
REN rental services
ADM public administration and social security
EDU education ad health
SER other non financial services
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Professional categories
1 directors
2 senior executive and members of liberal professions
3 junior staff
4 employees
5 commercants, commercial and financial intermediaries
6 farmers, fishermen, foresters, hunters and workers assimilate
7 craftsmen and artisanal trades qualified workers (farm labourers excluded)
8 workmen and farm labourers (including skilled workers)
9 drivers and assembly workers
10 warehousemen and workers of small trades
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APPENDIX 3
EQUATIONS OF THE MODEL
Notations
i and j refers to sectors, ps and pub to private and public sectors respectively, up
and ru to urban and rural private sectors, tr and ntr to tradable and non tradable
sectors, ag to agents, da to domestic agents, h to households and c to professional
categories. cm1 is the set of professional categories c excluding category n◦ 10.
Parameter definition
Aps Scale parameter of the value added CES function
αps Share parameter of this function
σps Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital
a Parameter in the value added function of subsistence agriculture
b Parameter in the value added function of subsistence agriculture
f Parameter in the value added function of subsistence agriculture
Bps Scale parameter of the Cobb-Douglas function of labour in sector ps
ωc,ps Share of category c in total labour demand by sector ps
Aiup Scale parameter of the CES function of imperfect substitutability be-
tween domestic workers and immigrants
Ωup Share parameter of this function
ςup Elasticity of substitution between domestic workers and immigrants
lpub Labour share in public value added (Leontief)
kpub Capital share in public value added (Leontief)
lcc,pub Share of category c in total labour demand (Leontief) by the public
sector
ioj Share of intermediary consumption in the production (Leontief) of se-
ctor j
vj Share of value added in the production (Leontief) of sector j
aiji,j Intermediary consumption of good i by unit of production of sector j
txj Indirect taxes on product j
tmtr Import tariff rate on product tr
tetr Export tariff rate on product tr
tyh Direct tax rate on household h’s income
tye Direct tax rate on firms’ income
Brc Scale parameter of the CET function of the rural population
$c Share parameter of this function
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εc Elasticity of transformation between international rural migrants and
national workers
Buc Scale parameter of the CET function of the rural population that de-
cides to stay in Morocco
ϑc Share parameter of this function
%c Elasticity of transformation between internal migrants and rural wor-
kers
Bic Scale parameter of the CET function of the urban population
ξc Share parameter of this function
oc Elasticity of transformation between international urban migrants and
urban workers
Betr Scale parameter of the CET production function
δtr Share parameter of this function
κtr Transformation elasticity (CET production function)
ϕtr Price elasticity of export demand
Amtr Scale parameter of the Armington CES function
θtr Share parameter of this function
χtr Substitution elasticity (Armington function)
γi,h Budgetary share of good i in the supernumerary income of household h
βc Leisure share in the income of rural household’s member c
β′c Leisure share in the income of urban household’s member c
lsmaxc Maximal number of working hours offered by rural worker c
lsmax′c Maximal number of working hours offered by urban worker c
λc Share of member c in rural household’s non-labour income
ζ1c Share of internal migrants in the labour supply of category c
ζ2c Share of African immigrants in the labour supply of category c
λ′c Share of member c in urban household’s non-labour income
µi Share of product i in total investment
θj Share of the value added of sector j in GDP at factor cost
ψh Household h’s propensity to save
ηag Share of capital remuneration received by agent ag
φag Share of labour remuneration received by agent ag
Dc Scale parameter of the wage curve
mc International migration costs
imc Internal migration costs
cs Social security contributions
Variable definition
Endogenous variables
a) Prices
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wj Average wage rate of sector j
wrc Rural wage rate of professional category c
wuc Wage rate of category c in the urban private sector
wgc Wage rate of category c in the urban public sector
wic International wage rate of category c, in foreign currency
wnc National wage rate of category c
wugc Average urban wage rate of category c
wupup Average wage of category “10” in private urban sector up
wac Expected urban wage of category c
rj Capital return in sector j
PVj Value added price of sector j
PLj Producer price of local product j
PDj Market price of local product j sold on the domestic market
Pj Production price of sector j
PCj Market price of the composite good belonging to sector j
Pwmtr International import price of product tr, in foreign currency
Pwetr International export price of product tr, in foreign currency
PMtr Domestic price of the imported good tr
PEtr Producer price of the exported good tr
Pfobtr Fob price of the exported good tr
PINV Aggregate price of investment
Plrc Leisure price of rural household’s member c
P luc Leisure price of urban household’s member c
e Nominal exchange rate (the price of a unit of foreign currency in
domestic currency)
Pindex GDP deflator, nume´raire
b) Production
XSj Production of sector j
V Aj Value added of sector j
DIi,j Intermediary demand of product i by sector j
CIj Total intermediary consumption of sector j
c) Factors of production
KDj Capital demand by sector j
LDRru Labour demand by rural sector ru
LRc,ru Labour demand of category c by rural sector ru
LDUup Labour demand by urban private sector up
LUc,up Labour demand of category c by urban private sector up
LDGpub Labour demand by public sector pub
LGc,pub Labour demand of category c by urban public sector pub
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LSRc Rural population belonging to category c
LSUc Urban population belonging to category c
uc Urban unemployment rate of category c
d) Migration
NATc Moroccan rural workers of category c who decide to stay in Moro-
cco
EMRc The flow of Moroccan rural emigrants belonging to category c
NATRc Moroccan rural workers of category c who decide to stay in rural
areas
MIGc Moroccan rural migrants flow of category c towards urban areas
NATUc Moroccan urban workers of category c who decide to stay in urban
areas
EMUc The flow of Moroccan urban emigrants belonging to category c
IMMIGc The stock of Sub-Saharan immigrants belonging to category c
NATIup The demand of national workers of category “10” by urban private
sector up
ETRup The demand of Sub-Saharan immigrants of category “10” by urban
private sector up
e) Income/Savings
Yag Agent ag’s income
Y Dh Disposable income of household h
Sag Agent ag’s savings
Tag,ag Transfers between agents
f) Tax revenues
TIj Indirect taxes on product j
TIMtr Import tariffs on product tr
TIEtr Export tariffs on product tr
adj Compensatory tax
g) External trade
EXStr Export supply of product tr
DOMj Domestic production of sector j sold on the domestic market
Qj Supply of the composite product belonging to sector j
EXDtr Export supply of product tr
Mtr Import demand of product tr
h) Final demand
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CTi,h Consumption of good i by household h
Cmini,h Minimum consumption of good i by household h
BCh Consumption budget of household h
IBCc,h Consumption budget of the member c belonging to household h
Gi Public consumption of product i
DITi Total intermediary consumption of product i
INVi Investment demand of product i
STKi Stock variation of product i
ITV OL Gross fixed capital formation (volume)
IT Gross fixed capital formation (value)
Exogenous variables
wgc Wage rate of category c in the urban public sector
wic International wage rate of category c, in foreign currency
rpub Capital return of public sector pub
KDps Capital demand by sector ps
Pwmtr International import price of product tr, in foreign currency
Pwetr International export price of product tr, in foreign currency
IMMIGc The stock of Sub-Saharan immigrants belonging to category c
Cmini,h Minimum consumption of product i by household h
Gi Public consumption of product i
STKi Stock variation of product i
ITV OL Gross fixed capital formation (volume)
S“row” External savings
Th,ag Transfers by agent ag to household h
T“fm”,ag Transfers by agent ag to firms
T“row”,ag Transfers by agent ag to the Rest of the World
T“gv”,“gv” Transfers made by the government to itself
T“gv”,“row” Transfers by the Rest of the World to the government
Pindex GDP deflator, nume´raire
Equations
Rural sector
XSru = V Aru/vru (A1)
CIru = ioruXSru (A2)
DIi,ru = aiji,ruCIru (A3)
V A“sa” = a(1− e−(LDR“sa”/b)f ) (A4)
43
V A“ia” = A“ia”[α“ia”LDR
(σ“ia”−1)/σ“ia”
“ia” + (1− α“ia”)KD(σ“ia”−1)/σ“ia”“ia” ]σ“ia”/(σ“ia”−1)(A5)
LDR“sa” =
PV“sa”V A“sa”
w“sa”
(A6)
LDR“ia”/KD“ia” = (
α“ia”
1− α“ia”
r“ia”
w“ia”
)σ“ia” (A7)
LDRru = Bru
∏
c
LRc,ru
ωc,ru (A8)
LRc,“sa” =
ωc,“sa”LDR“sa”w“sa”
wrc
(A9)
LRc,“ia” =
ωc,“ia”LDR“ia”w“ia”
wrc(1 + cs)
(A10)
NATRc = lsmaxc − βc(1− βc)prlc (IBCc,“hr” − λc
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hr”) (A11)
Urban private sector
XSup = V Aup/vup (A12)
CIup = ioupXSup (A13)
DIi,up = aiji,upCIup (A14)
V Aup = Aup[αupLDU
(σup−1)/σup
up + (1− αup)KD(σup−1)/σupup ]σup/(σup−1) (A15)
LDUup/KDup = (
αup
1− αup
rup
wup
)σup (A16)
LDUup = Bup
∏
c
LUc,up
ωc,up (A17)
LUcm1,up =
ωcm1,upLDUupwup
(1 + cs)wuc
(A18)
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LU“10”,up =
ω“10”,upLDUupwup
wupup
(A19)
LU“10”,up = Aiup[ΩupNATI
(ςup−1)/ςup
up + (1− Ωup)ETR(ςup−1)/ςupup ]ςup/(ςup−1)(A20)
ETRup
NATIup
= (
1− Ωup
Ωup
wu“10”(1 + cs)
wu“10”
)ςup (A21)
NATUc = lsmax′c −
β′c
(1− β′c)pluc
(1− ζ1c − ζ2c)(IBCc,“hu” − λ′c
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hu”)(A22)
Public sector
XSpub = V Apub/vpub (A23)
CIpub = iopubXSpub (A24)
DIi,pub = aiji,pubCIpub (A25)
V Apub = KDpub/kpub (A26)
LDGpub = lpubV Apub (A27)
LGc,pub = LDGpublcc,pub (A28)
KDpub =
PVpubV Apub − wpubLDGpub
rpub
(A29)
Migratory flows
LSRc = Brc[$cNAT (εc−1)/εcc + (1−$c)EMR(εc−1)/εcc ]εc/(εc−1) (A30)
EMRc
NATc
= (
$c
1−$c
wice(1−mc)
wnc
)−εc (A31)
NATc = Buc[ϑcNATR(%c−1)/%cc + (1− ϑc)MIG(%c−1)/%cc ]%c/(%c−1) (A32)
MIGc
NATRc
= (
ϑc
1− ϑc
wac(1− imc)
wrc
)−%c (A33)
LSUc = Bic[ξcNATU (oc−1)/occ + (1− ξc)EMU (oc−1)/occ ]oc/(oc−1)
EMUc
NATUc
= (
ξc
1− ξc
wice(1−mc)
wac
)−oc (A34)
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Income/Savings of households and firms
Y“hr” =
∑
ru
(
∑
c
wrcLRc,ru) + η“hr”
∑
j
rjKDj +
∑
ag
T“hr”,ag (A35)
Y“hu” = (1− φrow)[
∑
up
(
∑
c
wucLUc,up) +∑
pub
(
∑
c
wgcLGc,pub)] + η“hu”
∑
j
rjKDj +
∑
ag
T“hu”,ag (A36)
Y“fm” = (1− η“hr” − η“hu” − η“gv” − η“row”)
∑
j
rjKDj +
∑
ag
T“fm”,ag (A37)
Y D“hr” = Y“hr”(1− ty“hr” × adj)−
(T“hr”,“hr” + T“hu”,“hr” + T“fm”,“hr” + T“row”,“hr”) (A38)
Y D“hu” = Y“hu”(1− ty“hu” × adj)−
(T“hr”,“hu” + T“hu”,“hu” + T“fm”,“hu” + T“row”,“hu”) (A39)
Sh = ψhY Dh (A40)
BCh = Y Dh − Sh (A41)
S“fm” = Y“fm” −
∑
ag
Tag,“fm” (A42)
Government receipts and expenditures
TItr = txtr(PtrXStr − PEtrEXStr) + txtr(1 + tmtr)ePmwtrMtr (A43)
TIntr = txntrPLntrXSntr (A44)
TIMtr = tmtrePwmtrMtr (A45)
TIEtr = tetrPEtrEXStr (A46)
T“gv”,h = (tyh × adj)Yh (A47)
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T“gv”,“fm” = tyeY“fm” (A48)
Y“gv” = η“gv”
∑
j
rjKDj +
∑
tr
TIMtr +
∑
tr
TIEtr +
∑
j
TIj +
∑
ag
T“gv”,ag +
(
∑
up
wupLDUup −
∑
up
(
∑
c
wucLUc,up)) + (w“ar”LDR“ar” −
∑
c
wrcLRc,“ar”))(A49)
S“gv” = Y“gv” −
∑
i
PCiGi −
∑
ag
Tag,“gv” (A50)
External Trade
XStr = Betr[δtrEXS
(κtr−1)/κtr
tr + (1− δtr)DOM (κtr−1)/κtrtr ]κtr/(κtr−1) (A51)
XSntr = DOMntr (A52)
EXStr
DOMtr
= (
δtr
1− δtr
PLtr
PEtr
)κtr (A53)
EXDtr = EXDOtr(
Pwetr
Pfobtr
)ϕtr (A54)
Qtr = Amtr[θtrM
(χtr−1)/χtr
tr + (1− θtr)DOM (χtr−1)/χtrtr ]χtr/(χtr−1) (A55)
Qntr = DOMntr (A56)
Mtr
DOMtr
= (
θtr
1− θtr
PDtr
PMtr
)χtr (A57)
S“row” =
∑
tr
PwmtrMtr + φrow
∑
up(
∑
cwucLUc,up) +
∑
pub(
∑
cwgcLGc,pub)
e
+η“row”
∑
j rjKDj
e
+
∑
ag T“row”,ag
e
(A58)
−
∑
tr
PfobtrEXStr −
∑
ag Tag,row
e
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Final demand
CTi,“hr” = Cmini,“hr” +
γi,“hr”
PCi
(BC“hr” −
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hr”) (A59)
CTi,“hu” = Cmini,“hu” +
γi,“hu”
PCi
(BC“hu” −
∑
i
PCiCmini,“hu”) (A60)
IBCc,“hr” = (1− ψ“hr”)(1− ty“hr” × adj)wrc
∑
ru
LRc,ru + (A61)
λc(1− ψ“hr”)(1− ty“hr” × adj)[Y“hr” −
∑
c
(wrc
∑
ru
LRc,ru)]
IBCc,“hu” = (1− ψ“hu”)(1− ty“hu” × adj)(wuc
∑
up
LUc,up + wgc
∑
pub
LGc,pub)(A62)
+λ′c(1− ψ“hu”)(1− ty“hu” × adj)[Y“hu” −
∑
c
(wuc
∑
up
LUc,up + wgc
∑
pub
LGc,pub)]
INVi = µiIT/PCi (A63)
DITi =
∑
i
aiji,jCIj (A64)
Prices
ln
wuc
Pindex
= Dc − 0.1 lnuc (A65)
wgc  wuc (A66)
wnc =
wrc
∑
ru LRc,ru + wuc
∑
up LUc,up + wgc
∑
pub LGc,pub∑
ru LRc,ru +
∑
up LUc,up +
∑
pub LGc,pub
(A67)
wugc =
wuc
∑
up LUc,up + wgc
∑
pub LGc,pub∑
up LUc,up +
∑
pub LGc,pub
(A68)
wpub =
∑
c
wgcLGc,pub
LDGpub
(A69)
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wac = wugc
∑
up LUc,up +
∑
pub LGc,pub
NATUc + (1− imc)MIGc + IMMIGc (A70)
wupup =
(1 + cs)wu“10”NATIup + wu“10”ETRup
LU“10”,up
(A71)
r“ia” =
PV“ia”V A“ia” − w“ia”LDR“ia”
KD“ia”
(A72)
rup =
PVupV Aup − wupLDUup
KDup
(A73)
PVj =
PjXSj −
∑
i PCiDIi,j
V Aj
(A74)
PMtr = ePwmtr(1 + tmtr)(1 + txtr) (A75)
PEtr =
ePfobtr
(1 + tetr)
(A76)
PCtr =
DOMtrPDtr +MtrPMtr
Qtr
(A77)
PCntr = PDntr (A78)
PDj = PLj(1 + txj) (A79)
Ptr =
PLtrDOMtr + PEtrEXStr
XStr
(A80)
Pntr = PLntr (A81)
PINV =
∏
i
(
PCi
µi
)
µi
(A82)
Plrc = (1− ψ“hr”)(1− ty“hr” × adj)wrc (A83)
Pluc = (1− ψ“hu”)(1− ty“hu” × adj)(1− uc)wugc (A84)
Pindex =
∑
j
θjPVj (A85)
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Equilibrium conditions
NATRc =
∑
ru
LRc,ru (A86)
(NATUc + (1− imc)MIGc + IMMIGc)(1− uc) =
∑
up
LUc,up +
∑
pub
LGc,pub(A87)
Qi = Gi +DITi +
∑
h
CTi,h + INVi + STKi (A88)
EXStr = EXDtr (A89)
ITV OL = IT/PINV (A90)
IT +
∑
i
STKiPCi =
∑
da
Sda + eS”row” (A91)
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